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ABSTRACT 
Urban metro subway systems (metros) around the world are choosing increasing levels of 
automation for new and existing lines: the global length of metro lines capable of unattended 
train operation (UTO) is predicted to triple in the next ten years. Despite significant 
investment in this technology, empirical evidence for the financial and service quality 
impacts of UTO in metros remains scarce.  
We used questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with metros of the CoMET 
and Nova benchmarking groups to assemble emerging evidence for how automation affects 
costs, staffing, service capacity and reliability.  
Data from 23 lines suggest that UTO can reduce staff numbers by 30-70%, with the 
amount of wage cost reduction depending on whether staff on UTO lines are paid more. 
Based on the experience of seven metros, capital costs of lines capable of unattended 
operation are higher, but internal rate of return has been estimated by two metros at 10-15%. 
Automated lines are capable of operating at the highest service frequencies of up to 42 trains 
per hour, and the limited available data suggest that automated lines are more reliable.  
Our findings indicate that UTO is a means to a more flexible and reliable operating model 
that can increase metro productivity and efficiency. We identify important work that is 
needed to better understand impacts, identifying where statistical analyses will add value 
once sufficiently large datasets become available.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Globally, the use of Unattended Train Operations (UTO) in urban metro subway systems 
(metros) is a growing trend. From 2005-2013, the global length of UTO-capable metro lines 
grew from ~300km to 674km, and is expected to grow to 1800km by 2025 (1). For metro 
owners, project sponsors and funders, it is essential to optimise use of funds from fare and tax 
payers. Any investment in UTO technology must therefore be assessed in terms of 
maximising metro productivity and efficiency. Crucially, how much is the additional capital 
cost of the more advanced equipment, and is it justified by benefits to operating costs and/or 
the capacity and reliability of service? 
There is a dearth of academic literature systematically assessing the effects of UTO, 
so the knowledge gap has been filled by conferences (2, 3) and magazines (4-6). This 
literature tends to be based on general concepts (4), or the detailed experience of one metro 
(2, 3, 6). Academic knowledge is limited by a lack of global, comprehensive investigation of 
the technology using comparable data from multiple metros.  
This study contributes emerging evidence collected for the CoMET and Nova urban 
metro benchmarking groups towards understanding the cost and operational implications of 
UTO. Four specific research questions address how automation might affect various elements 
of metro productivity and efficiency as follows: 
 What is the additional capital cost of technology that enables UTO? 
 Assuming a constant number of stations and trains in service, what level of staffing is 
required on a UTO line compared with a conventional one? 
 How is the operational cost of a UTO line different to a conventional line (including 
effects related to staffing)? 
 How does UTO affect metro service outputs such as capacity and reliability? 
This paper begins by establishing key terminology in Section 2. Section 3 reviews 
literature regarding potential contributions of automation to metro efficiency and 
productivity. Section 4 describes the research method and data. Section 5 presents and 
discuses results, and finally Section 6 draws conclusions, identifying opportunities for future 
analysis as the global prevalence of UTO increases.  
2. TERMINOLOGY 
Discussion of ‘automated operations’ has involved a confusing array of terminology. In 
particular, the word ‘driverless’ reads as a synonym for ‘unattended’ but is elsewhere defined 
as referring to trains that do not have a driver’s cab but do require on-board staff (7), creating 
potential for confusion. The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard IEC-
62290 (8) has defined clear terminology to classify the Grade of Automation (GoA) of a 
metro, whereby:  
 GoA1 has automatic train protection (ATP) and is manually driven.  
 GoA2 has automatic train operation (ATO) with a driver in a cab performing critical 
functions such as closing doors and starting the train in motion.  
 GoA3 has ATO and a train attendant in the passenger car performing a critical function 
such as supervising safe door closure. 
 GoA4 is capable of unattended train operation (UTO). 
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A glossary explaining ATP and ATO in more detail is included at the end of this paper. 
Based on observations of metros, we identified a significant operational variant 
whereby a GoA4 system is operated with attendants on board every train, even though the 
system’s technical design does not require on-board staff. IEC-62290 is clear that the GoA 
terminology describes the system capability, not the operational model. Thus GoA4 systems 
can be operated either unattended (UTO); or with an attendant on board. Unlike in a GoA3 
system, the attendant in this scenario is not essential to the functioning of the train. This 
operational model is referred to in this paper as “attended GoA4”, to describe both the 
underlying system capability and the way it is operated. The flowchart in FIGURE 1 
illustrates the defining features of the different operational models.  
FIGURE 2 shows how these operational models relate to other common terminology. 
The figure is adapted from IEC-62290 solely for the purposes of demonstrating the 
operational differences in the application of the formal categorisation in the standard. 
Throughout this paper, lines are referred to by their operational model, and GoA3 and above 
are collectively referred to as ‘automated lines.’ We recommend that the term ‘driverless’ is 
not used, as it does not clearly distinguish between GoA3, attended-GoA4, or UTO, all of 
which involve trains operating without traditional drivers. 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The productivity and efficiency of metros 
Anderson et al indicated that a majority of metros studied received a public subsidy for 
operations (9). To ensure value for public funds, metros must try to optimise productivity, the 
absolute ratio of inputs to outputs; and efficiency, the relationship between actual outputs and 
maximum possible outputs. Coelli et al (10) note that the maximum possible productivity (the 
production frontier) changes over time as a result of technical development. Automation of 
metro systems to enable UTO is one such technical development which may increase the 
production frontier. 
Metro efficiency has been assessed for individual (11) and multiple metros (12), but 
without identifying the impact of particular technical characteristics such as automation.  
Quddus et al (13) investigated factors affecting station operating costs, but to our knowledge 
no similar study has assessed factors affecting the efficiency of train service operations. 
Productivity and efficiency benefits of automation 
Metro staff and productivity 
Couto and Graham (14) in a study of European mainline railways identified staff per train-
kilometre as an important determinant of cost inefficiency. Andreau and Ricart (15) deduced 
that organisational efficiency of metros is closely linked to availability and scheduling of 
drivers. Thus UTO has the potential to improve efficiency. Andreau and Ricart also observed 
that even GoA2 can simplify tasks, such that each individual staff member can learn more 
tasks and perform a more multi-skilled role, which could also increase efficiency (15).  
Several studies have shown that increasing train frequency increases demand (16-18). 
Therefore, operating trains of half the length at twice the frequency should increase ridership 
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with only marginally increased traction energy cost. The barrier to doing this on conventional 
lines is that driver costs would double. On UTO lines there is no additional driver cost, which 
could enable this demand-generative strategy. 
Technical requirements for substitution of labour by automation in GoA4 metros has 
received some coverage from a systems and technical perspective (19, 20), but systematic 
research investigating the effects on staff numbers (and staff costs) does not appear to be 
available. Paris Métro reports operational costs 30% lower for UTO than for conventional 
lines (21). Another operator (and supplier) of UTO systems, Keolis, estimates operational 
cost savings of 10% due to staff reductions (22).  
Efficient use of infrastructure  
In addition to reducing labour inefficiencies, automation can enable better use of available 
infrastructure. For example, GoA2 and above can enable higher operational speeds and train 
frequencies due to Automatic Train Operation (ATO) (21, 23). Paris Métro has reported that 
after upgrading from GoA1 to GoA4, Line 1 requires fewer rolling stock units to provide the 
same level of service (21). Additionally, removal of the driver’s cab provides more physical 
space within the train, which in Paris Métro Line 1 added 6% to capacity (21). 
There is evidence that increasing the level of automation improves reliability: 
switching from manual to automatic operation (from GoA1 to GoA2 or above) is associated 
with a 33% reduction in 5 minute delay incidents (23). However this study had insufficient 
data points available to disaggregate GoA2, GoA3 and GoA4. Reasons that GoA4 could 
improve reliability include removal of ‘driver unavailable’ as a reason for cancelled trains 
(15, 23), and reduced opportunity for incidents caused by human error (23, 24). Reliability 
affects both train-km and passenger-km outputs. Preston et al (25) show that long term 
unreliability can reduce passenger numbers, reducing metro effectiveness.  
Commercial data suggest that GoA4 lines achieve very high levels of reliability. The 
supplier and operator Keolis claims availability for unattended systems is 99% to 99.99%, 
compared with 96-98% for driven systems (22). It is unclear whether Keolis’ data refer to 
system availability (counting signalling faults only) or service availability (including 
disruptions of any cause). Dubai Metro has reported service availability of 99.97% (3). It is 
important to note that these data were reported by organisations with a vested interest in 
presenting GoA4 systems as highly reliable. Additionally, although these figures are all 
presented as percentages and so appear superficially comparable, their sources did not detail 
the method used to calculate the data, so it is not possible to judge whether consistent 
methods were used. Thus comparisons between these sources may not be valid. Comparing 
reliability of automated and conventional lines using a consistent measurement definition, 
validated over a number of years of data collection, will therefore be a new contribution. 
4. METHOD 
In 2013, automated metros accounted for 6% of the world’s metro line kilometres (1, 26). 
Metros operating both automated and conventional lines (enabling direct comparison) are 
more rare. Because benchmarking is a systematic process of “comparing, and understanding 
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organisations’ performance and change in performance” (27) it is an appropriate approach in 
this situation as it can be undertaken without large sample sizes.  
This paper represents outputs from what is defined by the European Commission-
funded EQUIP project (28) as the highest level of benchmarking, defined by exchange of 
confidential information, and direct engagement between companies to learn good practices 
and how improvements are implemented. The CoMET and Nova benchmarking groups are 
noted among the few organisations engaging in this level of benchmarking among public 
transport operators (12). 
Benchmarking staffing   
Previous studies have assessed staffing levels in terms of staff per train-kilometre (14). 
Scoping questions revealed that participating metros were not able to disaggregate staff per 
train-km by line. We therefore developed the ‘staff per asset’ measure as a way to normalise 
staffing levels according to the number of trains in service (service level) and the number of 
stations (as stations are the main driver of off-train staffing, and also a proxy for line length). 
The total number of operational staff working in the peak hour was divided by the total 
number of assets (trains and stations) in service. ‘Operational staff’ included those based in 
control centres, in stations, on trains, and roaming between stations and trains. This 
accounted for equivalence between roaming staff on a UTO line and train or station staff on a 
conventional line. Control centre staff were included to account for any substitution of line-
based staff for control centre staff on a UTO line.  
Data 
This study used data supplied by the CoMET and Nova benchmarking consortia of 32 metro 
system operators.
1
 Of these, ten metros operate automated lines – defined for this purpose as 
lines which do not have a traditional driver in a cab: GoA3 or GoA4. Twelve metros within 
the group are planning to build new or convert existing lines for automated operations in the 
future. Because of the small number of automated lines operated by CoMET and Nova 
members, six additional metros were invited to participate in the study, of which three 
participated: Copenhagen Metro, Milan Metro (Line 5), and Vancouver SkyTrain. 
A confidentiality agreement enabled the provision of data, but means research results 
must be anonymised for publication. Therefore, metros are identified throughout by 
operational model or by continent, as appropriate.  
A questionnaire and semi-structured interviews were used to obtain data to understand how 
automated and conventional lines differ in terms of: 
 Additional capital expenditure  
 Difference in operational expenditure (including maintenance expenditure) 
 Staff numbers and operational staffing models 
 Capacity (trains per hour) 
 Reliability (mean distance between failures) 
                                                 
1
 CoMET – large metros: Beijing, Berlin, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, London, Mexico City, Madrid, Moscow, 
New York, Paris Métro and RER, Santiago, Shanghai, Singapore, São Paulo and Taipei;  
Nova – medium and small metros: Bangkok, Barcelona, Buenos Aires, Brussels, Delhi, Docklands Light 
Railway (London), Istanbul, Kuala Lumpur, Lisbon, Montréal, Nanjing, Naples, Newcastle, Rio de Janeiro, 
Toronto and Sydney 
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Responses were received for 11 existing and 10 planned GoA4 lines, and 2 existing 
GoA3 lines. Of the existing GoA4 lines, three are attended-GoA4, and the other eight are 
UTO. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with metros currently operating a UTO 
line. All responses were followed up with data verification and clarification questions. 
In addition to data collected specifically for this study, we used existing CoMET and 
Nova benchmarking data, which benefits from many years of refined definitions and data 
validation. This included reliability data as described by Melo et al (23) and station dwell 
time and service regularity survey data as described by Harris and Anderson (29). 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Capital Cost 
Metros were asked what technology was considered absolutely necessary to enable UTO. 
Four features were reported by every respondent: 
 Capability to remotely control trains; 
 Remote monitoring and reset of rolling stock systems; 
 Two-way communications between operations control centre (OCC) and train; and 
 A platform edge safety system, which could be either an intrusion detection system or 
platform doors. 
FIGURE 3 illustrates the ‘additional’ costs of GoA4 equipment, as reported by seven 
metros (labelled by continent). We found that the “additional cost” for GoA4 depends on the 
baseline to which equipment is being compared – the technologies and capabilities used by a 
metro’s existing conventional systems. These vary widely. For instance, Asian metros tend to 
install platform doors as standard, so in Asia platform doors are not considered ‘additional’ 
for GoA4. Similarly, some metros have very basic standard rolling stock , as is the case for 
the metro that reported a 20% uplift in rolling stock cost for GoA4. In other metros, including 
two that reported additional costs as ‘not significant,’ the standard train for conventional lines 
already includes the advanced passenger information systems and remote condition 
monitoring capabilities that would be specified for GoA4. 
Even within GoA4, different capabilities may be specified. For example, an OCC 
with full remote control of stations as well as trains would cost more than one that can only 
remotely control trains. It is also important to note that rolling stock costs vary much more 
for reasons other than the difference between GoA2 and GoA4 specifications. Two metros 
reported rolling stock of similar specification varying in price by almost 40% depending on 
the number ordered or the supplier.  
Two metros had calculated the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of UTO prior to 
implementation. IRR illustrates the yield of an investment, so an IRR higher than the cost of 
capital indicates a desirable investment. Compared with a GoA2 baseline, a European metro 
estimated IRR at 12-15%, equivalent to a 10-year return on investment. An Asian metro 
estimated IRR of >10% for UTO compared with attended-GoA4, assuming that the change 
from attended-GoA4 to UTO involved a 50% reduction in on-train staff.  
Operational Cost 
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Consistent data regarding how different elements of operational cost are directly affected by 
UTO were not available. Overall, operating costs may be affected mainly by staff and 
maintenance cost differences, but metros were unable to disaggregate these costs between 
automated and conventional lines.  
Anecdotal evidence from two metros indicates that it is not possible to translate 
staffing levels directly to operational costs, because multi-skilled staff on UTO lines may be 
paid more than drivers or station staff on conventional lines. Wage cost changes would 
depend on a metro-specific decision about headcount reduction and any average wage 
increase. However, de-linking the number of trains from the number of drivers does reduce 
the role of staff costs in limiting service frequency increase – meaning that traction energy 
consumption would become the key operational cost constraint. Two metros reported they 
chose to procure a UTO system with shorter trains rather than a conventional system, with the 
intention to operate the same total car-km but using shorter trains at higher frequencies. This 
strategy is demand-generative, minimising traction energy consumption whilst providing 
better value than a longer-train, lower-frequency solution. 
Maintenance cost effects were also unquantifiable. One European and two Asian 
metros reported that remote condition monitoring and equipment redundancy reduce the 
amount of preventive maintenance that needs to be done on GoA4 lines, but also noted that 
spare parts are more expensive. In two metros where maintenance costs for automated and 
conventional lines were different, organisational or technological confounding factors make it 
impossible to distinguish the cause of the difference. 
Staffing models 
Staff information was provided for sixteen existing and seven planned lines of all grades of 
automation. Four distinct staffing models were identified: 
 Roaming multi-skilled staff only, with stations and trains mostly unattended (five GoA4 
lines) 
 Fixed station staff and roaming multi-skilled staff on some trains (seven GoA4 lines) 
 Fully attended trains, with most stations unattended (two GoA3 lines) 
 Fully attended trains and stations, as would typically be found on conventional lines (five 
Attended-GoA4, two GoA1 and two GoA2 lines) 
Staff per asset was calculated to normalise for number of stations and trains in 
service. FIGURE 4 shows staff per asset for each line, indicating the staffing model and the 
grade of automation. The lowest staffing ratios are for lines with unattended stations as well 
as unattended train operations – an operating model which could be named Unattended Metro 
Operations - UMO. The wage-cost benefit to metros of adopting a fully automated operating 
model with automated trains and stations may lead metros planning automated lines to 
consider incorporating automated stations within the operating model as well.  
FIGURE 5 illustrates the range of staffing ratios associated with different staffing 
models. The ‘fully staffed’ model of attended trains and stations had the widest range of staff 
per asset. Part of this variation is due to the larger sample size, but it also incorporated an 
unusually intensely staffed metro which has large numbers of platform staff to cope with 
extreme crowding. The majority of metros in the ‘fully staffed’ category were clustered 
closely around a staffing ratio of 1.4-1.6. The ‘minimal’ staffing model of unattended stations 
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and trains was centred on 0.5-0.6 staff per asset. The data for both these staffing models are 
non-normally distributed, with skewiness values of 1.4 and 1.8 respectively. In both cases, 
the means are notably higher than the median due to the influence of outliers. The medians 
are therefore used as the basis for comparison. The ‘minimal’ staffing model has a median 
staffing ratio 70% less than that of the ‘fully staffed’ lines. The ‘attended stations, unattended 
trains’ model incorporated lines with high station staffing levels and those with only one staff 
member per station. The inter-quartile range therefore incorporates a high degree of variation 
in staffing models. The median staffing ratio for this operational model is 29% below that for 
the fully staffed lines. 
A number of metros commented that, as hypothesised by Andreau and Ricart (15), 
UTO resulted in more multi-skilled roles for staff. One European metro reported that 
automated lines had lower absenteeism and attributed this to the increased diversity of tasks 
compared with driving. 
Service Outputs 
Capacity 
Service Frequency  In a set of service frequency data for 156 CoMET and Nova metro lines 
(including planned automated lines), a frequency of 30 trains per hour (tph) represented the 
fourth quintile and is considered a ‘very high’ frequency (FIGURE 6). The majority of 
existing and planned GoA4 lines are in this category, and the two highest-frequency lines at 
42tph are both GoA4. Very high frequencies are possible on conventional and automated 
systems – communications-based train control (CBTC) signalling systems are essentially the 
same for GoA2, GoA3 and GoA4. However, UTO can enable higher frequency by reducing 
turnaround times at the terminus. Improvements in frequency are also enabled by better 
regularity and consistency of station stop times: human factors can create variability and 
small delays in GoA2 and GoA3 lines (29). 
 
Regularity  Station dwell time and service regularity survey data were classified according to 
the grade of automation of the line, and interrogated for trends. Only 6 out of 66 available 
surveys related to GoA4 lines, so it is not possible to draw conclusions at this time. However, 
initial indications are that GoA4 operations may be associated with more consistent headways 
between trains, as indicated by a coefficient of variation (CofV) of 0.12 for headway 
regularity, compared with 0.28 for GoA2 lines and 0.36 for GoA1. A similar pattern for dwell 
time consistency showed CofV of 0.11 for GoA4, compared with 0.27 for GoA2 and 0.33 for 
GoA1. 
These observations concur with one metro’s finding that headway regularity on their 
automated line is 99.8%, compared with 99.0% on their conventional lines. If headways are 
irregular, trains after a long gap are overcrowded, whilst a train following close behind 
another is much emptier so service quality suffers because more customers experience higher 
levels of crowding. Better regularity ensures that capacity provided is used efficiently and 
enables higher service frequency.  
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Dwell times  Dwell times are an important component of train frequency. On conventional 
lines, staff are typically responsible for initiating train dispatch and so determine the length of 
dwell times.  On automatic lines, dwell times are programmed into the system. To account for 
random variation in passenger volumes and to reduce the risk of door holding, automated 
dwell times may be set longer than actual dwell times on conventional lines.  In some cases, 
dwell times were deliberately lengthened: one metro extended dwell times from 45 to 60 
seconds at interchanges because people were still trying to board the train after 45 seconds. 
Insufficient evidence is currently available to determine whether programmed dwell times 
necessarily need to be longer on a GoA4 line. However, even if GoA4 lines require slightly 
longer dwell times, improved consistency of those dwell times may more than offset potential 
capacity impacts. Platform doors almost always lead to increased dwell times because the 
larger doors take 1-2 seconds extra to open and close (29). However, platform doors are used 
as standard in many metros in Asia, and would be a drawback of automation only if not 
already used on conventional lines. 
 
Cab removal  The removal of the driver’s cab has benefits for both capacity and also 
potentially costs. Prototype studies by a European metro indicated that a driver’s cab took the 
equivalent space of 11 seats. A metro in the Americas estimates that the absence of cabs 
increases train capacity by 4-5%. Procuring trains without cabs can have a cost-reducing 
effect: one European metro reported that trains without cabs were 1% cheaper than the 
equivalent with cabs. 
Flexibility 
GoA4 decouples train availability from staff availability. This enables better matching of 
capacity to demand, including adding service at short notice and low marginal cost. All 
metros with UTO lines named this flexibility as the key operational advantage of GoA4. One 
metro noted that on their GoA4 line they can add as many trains as needed for special events, 
rather than balancing extra service against cost. One European metro now needs one hour’s 
notice rather than three months to schedule service for unusual events.  
Attended-GoA4 systems are capable of temporarily operating unattended to prevent a 
delay caused by staff unavailability. This is a benefit of attended-GoA4 lines over GoA3 
lines. One of the three attended-GoA4 metros occasionally operates a train unattended as 
needed to prevent a delay, and thus retains the flexibility of GoA4. 
Reliability 
Six GoA3 and GoA4 metro lines provided reliability data according to a common definition 
of Mean Distance (train-km) Between Failures causing an incidents lasting ≥5 minutes 
(MDBF). As noted by Barron et al (30), passenger-focused metrics such as train and 
passenger delay hours are preferable, as response to some incidents on unattended lines may 
be prolonged if on-site intervention is required. Unfortunately, data of sufficient quality are 
generally not available for these measures. However, the MDBF data have been checked and 
verified according to a long-established definition developed by the CoMET and Nova 
benchmarking groups (23, 30). 
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The automated lines all had reliability levels within the top third of CoMET and Nova 
network-wide averages (FIGURE 7). The two lines that had lower reliability than the rest of 
their networks, belong to two of the most reliable CoMET and Nova metros – and both lines 
have other technological differences from the rest of the metro that are unrelated to UTO. The 
automated lines in this analysis are all relatively new, so high reliability might be expected on 
account of equipment age. This is therefore an area where additional data in the future will 
enable more robust analysis. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has been the first to systematically assess the impacts of UTO using a global 
sample of metros. The findings indicate that GoA4 may have a higher capital cost than 
conventional and GoA3 lines, but that technologies required for GoA4 are increasingly being 
adopted for lower grades of automation – making the technological leap to GoA4 
progressively smaller. Internal rates of return on investment in GoA4 reported by two metros 
were in the 10-15% region. Operational cost data availability was limited, and could be 
improved as part of more extensive line-level benchmarking across metros as a whole.  
Staffing level data indicate that GoA4 can enable productivity and efficiency 
improvements. We developed the ‘staff per asset’ method of normalising line staffing levels, 
and showed that with the leanest staffing levels, UTO lines may have 70% fewer staff than 
conventional lines with staffed stations. On UTO lines where stations are staffed, headcount 
savings are around 30%. These findings are practice-ready, enabling metro organisations to 
compare their staffing levels against those of their peers. We also found that GoA4 lines are 
not always operated unattended, identifying ‘Attended-GoA4’ as a distinct operating model.  
GoA4 operations appear to enable a more regular service with more consistent stop 
times. This in turn enables high train frequencies up to 42tph. GoA4 also enables increased 
operational flexibility to respond to delay incidents and unusual levels of crowding. Data for 
six automated lines showed them to have reliability equivalent to the top third of CoMET and 
Nova member metro networks. Future research will be able to compare reliability more 
robustly as the number of automated lines increases the availability of data, and there is a 
greater range of system ages.   
Study Limitations and Future Research 
This study was limited by the small available sample size, particularly for the assessment of 
reliability and of staffing levels. It is hoped that as the number of automated metros increases, 
it will be possible to study these issues in more detail with a larger dataset. In addition, 
several of the automated lines in this study were in their first few years of operation – with 
more years of operation there will be more data to analyse. Thus a key contribution of this 
study is identifying areas for deeper analysis in future. These include: 
 Analysis of predicted versus actual capital and operating costs from the twelve CoMET 
and Nova metros planning to start operating an automated line in the next ten years. 
 Econometric analysis of line-level operating cost data for metro lines of all grades of 
automation, to understand the impact of automation on operating cost. Ideally this dataset 
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would include time-series data for metro lines being converted from conventional to 
automated. 
 Examination of staffing levels on more metro lines, including conventional ones, to 
understand better the distribution of staff per asset levels within and between individual 
staffing models. 
 Statistical analysis of association between Grade of Automation and reliability (MDBF), 
which will require more years of data from metros with both conventional and automated 
lines. Inclusion of line-level data for new conventional lines will enable like-for-like 
comparison of automated and conventional lines of similar age. 
 Analysis to determine whether incidents on UTO lines have longer duration, as measured 
by train delay hours and/or passenger delay hours, which will require better data recording 
within metros to obtain these data according to a consistent definition and calculation method 
(30). 
 Further dwell time surveys to determine whether the apparently better consistency of 
service regularity and station stop times on GoA4 lines is statistically significant. 
7. GLOSSARY 
GoA  Grade of Automation, with grades 1 to 4 (see Section 2) 
ATP  Automatic Train Protection – automatic system which prevents unsafe movements 
but does not otherwise control the train. 
ATS  Automatic Train Supervision – system that regulates train service automatically 
ATO  Automatic Train Operation – train movement is controlled automatically, rather 
than manually by the driver. 
UTO  Unattended Train Operation – train operation with no staff member on board. 
UTO is only possible with a GoA4 system, but not all GoA4 systems are operated 
unattended. 
UMO  Unattended Metro Operations – metro operations without fixed staff in either 
trains or stations. 
MDBF Mean Distance Between Failures – a technical measure of reliability 
tph  Trains per hour 
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FIGURE 1  Flowchart relating operating models to grades of automation 
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FIGURE 2  Schematic matrix clarifying the operational characteristics of different 
approaches to automation  
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FIGURE 3  Additional capital cost of technology for a GoA4 system 
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FIGURE 4  Operational staff per asset during peak hour 
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FIGURE 5  Effect of staffing model on staff per asset 
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FIGURE 6  Service frequencies of existing and planned GoA4 lines 
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FIGURE 7  Reliability of Automated Lines Compared with Whole Metro Networks 
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